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neuroscience. The answer has not yet been found, and dif-
ficulties lie in the complex nature of emotions, which are 
comprised of multiple components such as autonomic 
arousal, behaviour, and subjective experience. These 
aspects are known to be dependent on partly separate 
neural systems. In this paper, we focus on neural systems 
underlying phenomenological aspects of affective states, 
which bring valence “colours” to our everyday life expe-
rience. Co-variation of EEG data with the ongoing emo-
tional state is considered in the context of two dominant lit-
erature models: the “locationist” and the “constructionist” 
approach.
The search for a neural basis of affective experience has 
a long history. During this time, the locationist paradigm 
(closely linked with the basic emotions theory) has become 
the most prevalent approach. It assumes that discrete emo-
tions (such as sadness, happiness, and fear) are “created” 
by specific and usually separate brain centres (Ekman 
1992; Barrett 2006a). It is then supposed that: (1) a particu-
lar brain region shows increased activity each time a person 
experiences a particular emotion (consistency); (2) every 
discrete emotion has a unique neural pattern (specificity). 
For example, emotions of fear and sadness are proposed to 
be mediated by distinct neural structures, and each occur-
rence of a particular emotion is associated with the same 
brain arousal pattern.
Several meta-analytic reviews have been conducted 
in a locationist paradigm. Two influential fMRI and PET 
reviews (Phan et al. 2002; Murphy et al. 2003) were gener-
ally inconclusive and only partially supportive of the view 
that basic emotions are uniquely represented in specific 
brain regions. Both reviews focused on five basics emo-
tions: happiness, sadness, anger, fear, and disgust. They 
managed to find some common neural activations associ-
ated with emotions of fear and sadness and concluded 
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that the underlying neural systems of basic emotions are 
only partly separate. What is more, the reviews reached 
only incomplete agreement regarding the associations 
between specific brain structures and particular basic emo-
tions. More recent fMRI meta-analyses (Kober et al. 2008; 
Lindquist et al. 2012) have challenged the usefulness of 
a locationist approach in explaining brain bases of emo-
tions. The main criticism is that discrete emotions are not 
consistently and specifically associated with activation 
of a particular brain structure (Posner et al. 2005; Barrett 
et al. 2007). In addition, the question arises as to whether 
discrete emotional states really exist as separate brain 
and body states or whether they are just reflecting emo-
tion words available in natural languages, dependent on 
one’s interpretation of the situational context (Schachter 
and Singer 1962; Russell 2003; Barrett 2006b). All things 
considered, the fundamental assumptions of a locationist 
approach have not been confirmed.
Recently, the constructionist approach has been intro-
duced to analyse the neural basis of emotions from a per-
spective of broader, less-specific emotional dimensions. It 
assumes that elicitation of emotions involves the interaction 
of wider neural networks, which subserve domain-general 
functions that are not specific to single discrete emotions 
(Lindquist and Barrett 2012; Barrett and Satpute 2013; 
Lindquist 2013). As there is some recent evidence that 
focusing on more general emotional dimensions instead of 
discrete affective categories may enable easier interpreta-
tion of neuroimaging data, we follow this view in the pre-
sent study. Therefore, we propose a dimensional approach 
as a basis for the search for neural correlates of emotional 
experience. The dimensional concept is well established 
in psychometric studies of emotions and originates from 
factor analyses of self-report questionnaire data (Russell 
et al. 1981; Watson and Tellegen 1985). It posits that all 
emotions can be represented by a small number of dimen-
sions and aims to provide the most economical and syn-
thetic framework for a description of the affective state. 
However, there is substantial disagreement about the opti-
mal number of dimensions to characterise emotions. Most 
of the models propose two factors: valence (ranging from 
negative to positive) and arousal (low to high; Posner et al. 
2005). Nonetheless, the two-dimensional models have been 
criticized for their lack of differentiation when it comes to 
emotions that are close on the valence and arousal space, 
such as anger and fear (Tellegen et al. 1999; Fontaine et al. 
2007). Therefore, we propose to use a well-established, 
three-dimensional space with the additional factor of domi-
nance, representing a sense of control while experiencing 
the emotion and its dominant nature (high dominance can 
be considered as an external, while low dominance as an 
internal locus of control; Mehrabian 1970; Russell and 
Mehrabian 1977; Bradley and Lang 1994). It is commonly 
referred to as the valence (or pleasure)–arousal–dominance 
(VAD) model. As the dominance dimension is coupled with 
the relationship between the person and their environment, 
it is also linked to a threat–challenge dimension (Lazarus 
1966; Blascovich and Tomaka 1996), whereby one may 
feel in control of a given situation and perceive it as a chal-
lenge, or, on the other hand, be overwhelmed and threat-
ened by the situation. To sum up, the proposed VAD model 
seems to be sufficiently concise and, on the other hand, 
have enough discriminating power to precisely describe the 
emotional experience.
Although there are a considerable number of neuroim-
aging studies regarding valence or arousal dimensions, the 
issue still remains elusive. The search for neural bases of 
emotional dimensions dates back to studies where the con-
cept of frontal asymmetry was investigated in terms of the 
state of valence using EEG (Davidson et al. 1979). Further 
development of neuroimaging methods brought new oppor-
tunities for studying the effects of emotional valence (Lane 
et al. 1997). Since then, many studies have been conducted 
on valence or arousal dimensions, but the results remain 
partly inconsistent. As shown by fMRI/PET meta-analyses, 
no specific brain region associated with these dimensions 
has been found (Wager et al. 2003; Murphy et al. 2003). 
Some data point to the fact that the activity of a specific 
part of the brain could be related not only to the intensity 
of valence and arousal, but also to specific combinations 
of these two (e.g. negative and low arousal; Nielen et al. 
2009). Other data suggest that the above dimensions are 
not reflected in activations of focal brain regions but rather 
in distributed patterns of activity in the whole brain (Bau-
com et al. 2012). Despite these ambiguities, Kassam et al. 
(2013) concluded that the dimensional approach (consist-
ing of a few basic factors) is more informative with respect 
to understanding the neural basis of emotions than the 
discrete emotions account. Only one discrete emotion cat-
egory (disgust) was reliably associated with focal brain 
activations, while basic emotional dimensions successfully 
denoted neural patterns of activations. This seems a prom-
ising approach and the issue is worth exploring.
Usually, in the above-mentioned studies, the research-
ers did not apply any self-report measurements to assess 
and verify the experiential aspect of emotion. Instead, par-
ticipants were only instructed to watch emotional stimuli, 
recollect affective events, or deliberately evoke emotions. 
To our knowledge, only Colibazzi et al. (2010) have used 
self-report measures when exploring the brain basis of 
valence and arousal dimensions. Moreover, none of the 
studies have measured spontaneously experienced affect, 
but have rather applied mood induction procedures, which 
were assumed to induce the intended emotional state. The 
most common procedure is to present normative emotional 
stimuli from the International Affective Picture System 
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(IAPS; Lang et al. 1999). Although most of the neuroim-
aging studies on emotions use visual stimuli to evoke spe-
cific affect, everyday emotional feelings depend on a wider 
class of emotional events, including stimuli of different 
modalities (Baumgartner et al. 2006). Unarguably, mood 
manipulation benefits from the fact that the affect is better 
controlled, but at the same time other possible confounds 
can be introduced, since any cognitive task performed on 
affective stimuli may change neural responses in regions 
associated with emotions (Taylor et al. 2003). Even passive 
watching conditions introduce additional involvement of 
perceptual processes, which overlap with the brain activity 
related to spontaneous mood experience (Garrett and Mad-
dock 2006). The importance of more natural experimental 
settings with spontaneous mood measurement has recently 
been raised in the literature (Silvers et al. 2014). Hence, to 
eliminate possible confounds, we decided to focus on spon-
taneous affect and record brain activity in task-free condi-
tions. On the one hand, this introduces some discretion for 
subjects which remains beyond experimental control. On 
the other, we know that in such a situation, subjects tend 
to focus on self-related memories, future plans, and cur-
rent concerns, and this content remains emotionally laden 
(Gruberger et al. 2011; Fox et al. 2013). It has been argued 
that such self-referential mental activity recruits unspecific 
affective brain networks of affective experience (Wycz-
esany et al. 2014), which further justifies our approach. 
Finally, to our knowledge, none of the studies have recog-
nized the neural bases of the dominance dimension, which 
was included in our analyses.
The aim of the present study was to determine whether 
the three-dimensional model of affect is reflected at the 
level of brain activity patterns. We assumed that three-
dimensional emotional space (VAD) can better reflect the 
way neural processes underlie affective states. What is 
more, we assumed that affective self-report is crucial for 
explaining emotional phenomena. Our study fills the gap 
between older EEG experiments based on channel-derived 
spectral data and numerous fMRI studies, which provide 
excellent spatial resolution but also raise some doubts 
about the serious impact on emotional processes due to 
highly unnatural measurement conditions (Harmon-Jones 
and Peterson 2009).
Instead of classical analysis of channel data, we decided 
to identify the underlying brain sources that can be thought 
of as anatomically distinct cortical patches (Makeig et al. 
1996). Such an approach allowed us to disentangle the con-
tribution of individual neural generators, enabling more 
direct inferences about their functional significance. The 
processing path included data-driven separation of inde-
pendent neural sources whose signals are normally mixed 
up in the EEG signal recorded from the scalp. To recon-
struct the original signals, independent component analysis 
(ICA) decomposition was carried out using the criterion 
for maximizing the independence of resulting components 
(Delorme and Makeig 2004). Next, source localization was 
performed for these components in 3D brain space. An 
important difference between channel and component anal-
ysis occurs at the group level, since the sequence of compo-
nents resulting from ICA reflects a decreasing contribution 
to the analysed signal, so they are arranged in descending 
order of strength. Due to individual differences in cortical 
folding, the resulting sequence of components is unique in 
each subject (in the case of classic channel analysis, there is 
always a correspondence between electrodes across all par-
ticipants). Hence, to identify the functionally correspond-
ing components across subjects, they need to be compared 
based on additional criteria (location, scalp map, and acti-
vation pattern) and then clustered together for group-level 
statistical analysis.
Materials and methods
The procedure was compliant with the Helsinki Declara-
tion and approved by the University Ethical Committee. A 
total of 58 volunteers (34 women; mean age 21; SD 1.8), 
participated in the study. All were medication free with no 
reported history of any neurological or psychiatric disease 
or any substance abuse. Before the procedure started, all of 
them signed a written consent form.
The experiment took place in a cabin, illuminated with 
dimmed light. The procedure was briefly explained to par-
ticipants and electrodes were attached. The EEG record-
ing was performed during rest conditions and there was 
no specific task given to participants. Instead, they were 
advised to sit still and keep their eyes open during the 
recording phase. Then, 5-min spontaneous EEG record-
ing commenced. Immediately afterwards, subjects were 
presented a computerized version of the PANAS-X scale. 
Using 60 adjectives, subjects had to evaluate how particu-
lar adjectives referred to their current feeling at the very 
moment of assessment (ranging from 1—“not at all” to 
5—“extremely”). Words were presented on a computer 
screen and subjects were supposed to answer by keyboard 
input. This was followed by another spontaneous EEG 
recording which lasted 3 min. Next, subjects took part in 
another procedure, which did not form part of this study. 
The experimental timeline is depicted in Fig. 1.
The Biosemi appliance with 64 active cap electrodes 
arranged according to the 10–10 system was used for EEG 
recording. Two additional electrodes were placed on both 
mastoids and another four placed above and below the right 
eye and in the external canthi of both eyes. Data were sam-
pled at 256 Hz. The preprocessing was done using EEGLab 
package (Delorme et al. 2011). The signal was filtered 
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with 1 Hz high-pass and 46 Hz low-pass zero-phase filters 
(FIR type with group delay correction, order: 846 and 74, 
respectively; Widmann 2012). Data channels with severe 
technical failures (excessive noise, prolonged loss of skin 
connection) were then rejected based on visual inspec-
tion (no subject had more than two channels rejected). 
The entire (5 min) spontaneous recording was divided into 
2-s segments (overlapped 0.5 s), and an automatic artifact 
rejection routine was then carried out using both threshold 
level (below −80 μV and over +150 μV) and abnormal 
spectra (excessive power in beta/gamma frequencies with 
threshold set to 30 dB above the electrode average in the 
25–45 Hz range on scalp electrodes). The lengths of the 
remaining data were checked (the rejection rate did not 
exceed 3 % of the whole recording in any given subject). 
Then, a blind source separation algorithm (ICA) was used 
to process data from scalp and ocular electrodes. Equiva-
lent source dipoles of identified-independent components 
(ICs) were localized using the DIPFIT2 method (Oosten-
veld et al. 2011) based on a realistic standardized boundary 
element head model (BEM).
Artifactual ICs which originated in oculomotor activity, 
blinks, muscle activity, or technical problems were rejected 
on the basis of localization, time characteristics relative to 
stimuli onset and spectral power (Jung et al. 2000). Moreo-
ver, an additional check for possible confounding ocular 
components was applied; the normalized cross-correlation 
values (for zero time lag) between vertical and horizontal 
ocular electrodes were determined for all ICs. Two result-
ing values for each IC were then used as an input for clus-
tering analysis (Ward method, number of clusters set to 2) 
to check the dissimilarity of ICs previously classified as 
ocular-related and ocular-independent.
Next, the dipoles which were localized subcortically 
were also ignored, due to the limited capability of surface 
recordings to pick up deep sources of activity together 
with their poor localization accuracy (Michel et al. 2004). 
Remaining ICs whose residual variance (RV) of dipole 
location was greater than 15 % were rejected (Hammon 
et al. 2008). Finally, the K-means clustering was applied 
in order to group together functionally similar ICs across 
subjects. The distance function for estimating the similar-
ity included both the 3D location in standardized brain 
space (70 % weight) and the power spectra in the beta 
band (15–25 Hz; 30 % weight, reduced to 10 PCA dimen-
sions). The former factor is relatively robust to alteration 
of scalp maps due to cortex folding, while the latter was 
introduced in order to distinguish between similarly located 
but functionally distinct components (Onton and Makeig 
2006). The initial number of IC clusters (k) to be searched 
for was set to 20, and the threshold level for outliers was 
equal to 2.5 SD of the similarity distance. The clustering 
procedures were iterated with the k parameter decreased 
by 1 in each consecutive run until the IC clusters remained 
distinct in terms of anatomical and functional plausibility 
(Jung et al. 2007). Additionally, in cases where multiple 
components from one person were included in a cluster, 
they were averaged before the statistical analysis in order to 
retain the correct level of degrees of freedom (Onton et al. 
2006). Since the subjects’ emotional state/activation level 
can slowly fluctuate, even in rest conditions, on a timescale 
of minutes (Wyczesany et al. 2010), the main spectral anal-
ysis was performed during the last 2 min of data recording, 
which directly preceded the PANAS-X questionnaire. The 
rationale for limiting the length of data for this analysis was 
to make EEG and self-report measurements quasi-simul-
taneous, i.e. taken in as similar an emotional state as pos-
sible (Wyczesany et al. 2008, 2009). For each IC cluster, 
the average of the absolute EEG spectral power in the beta 
range (15–25 Hz) was computed using the FFT method, 
and resulting values were log transformed. The beta band 
was chosen as a direct marker of the level of cortical activ-
ity (Andreassi 2006).
The questionnaire data were processed, yielding 11 
scales which describe discrete emotional states (fear, hos-
tility, guilt, sadness, joviality, self-assurance, attentiveness, 
shyness, fatigue, serenity, and surprise). Preliminarily, the 
Pearson-r correlations between the scales and beta power 
in all considered IC clusters were computed after ensuring 
a normal distribution of variables. Next, in order to convert 
PANAS-X scales into three-dimensional VAD reference 
space, we used additional data from 168 students (137 
females, median age 19, range 18–43 years), who had to 
estimate each of the PANAS-X adjective items in terms of 
the three VAD dimensions. These estimates, after averaging 
and median split, were used to assign each of the PANAS-
X scales to the category of either low or high value, sepa-
rately for each VAD dimension: positive/negative valence, 
high/low arousal, high/low dominance (except “guilt”, 
which was not included in the arousal category, and “sur-
prise”, which was not included in the dominance category, 
since they were ranked very close to the median value on 
these dimensions). The VAD scores within each high/low 
category were then averaged. Next, in order to determine 
Fig. 1  Timeline of the procedure
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the relationships between EEG activity and VAD dimen-
sions, two regression analyses were carried out for each IC 
cluster. They included a 2 × 2 layout of PANAS-X scale 
categories as predictors: either valence and arousal or 
valence and dominance.1 A series of linear stepwise regres-
sions with variance inflation factor (VIF) estimates of mul-
ticollinearity were carried out in order to determine the 
VAD categories configuration that can significantly predict 
EEG activity. Initially, all four factors were included and 
then automatically removed in iterative steps to retain the 
optimal regression model. Due to multiple comparisons 
performed, adjustment of resulting p-levels was carried out 
using the false discovery rate (FDR) procedure (Benjamini 
and Hochberg 1995). Additionally, we assessed the accu-
racy of the regression results using the leave-one-out cross-
validation. Firstly, for each of the regression models, deter-
mined on n-1 samples of data, we computed residuals 
(differences between predicted and actual values). To 
aggregate these residuals into a single measure, we com-
puted the root mean square error (RMSE). Then, the RMSE 
was normalized to the range of observed values (NRMSE). 
Finally, as the NRMSE can be considered as a percentage 
error (%NRMSE), we defined prediction accuracy as 
100 % − %NRMSE. Apart from the main analysis based 
on the VAD categories, Pearson-r correlations between 
scores on original discrete PANAS-X scales and the beta 
power of the revealed clusters were also calculated.
Results
Mean ratings and standard deviations for all PANAS-X 
scales are presented in Table 1. Translation of PANAS-X 
scales onto VAD dimensions and their assignment to high/
low categories according to VAD values are shown in 
Table 2.
An additional eye movement check revealed two appar-
ently separate clusters with the following values of cross-
correlation: ρveog = 0.828 (SD 0.116), ρheog = 0.430 (SD 
0.184) for the cluster identified as related to eye move-
ments and ρveog = 0.001 (SD 0.082), ρheog = 0.055 (SD 
0.111) for the non-oculomotor one. Thus, it was confirmed 
that none of the components considered in further analyses 
could originate from eye movements.
The clustering procedure of the EEG-independent com-
ponents revealed nine brain-related, cortical clusters. Their 
location in the standardized Talairach space is depicted 
in Table 3. Four of them revealed significant regression 
effects. For the MCC cluster, beta power activation was 
1
 The low number of discrete emotions prevented an all-in-one 
2 × 2 × 2 analysis. Valence as a core dimension for emotional expe-
rience was then used in both regressions.
significantly predicted by negative PANAS-X scales of 
low dominance (R = 0.50; F(2,26) = 9.43; p = 0.005; 
padj = 0.045). The ACC cluster showed significant rela-
tionships with the PANAS-X scales of negative valence 
and low arousal (R = 0.41; F(1,33) = 6.97; p = 0.013; 
padj = 0.039). In the case of the LATL cluster, the best 
fit of the regression model (R = 0.53; F(2,23) = 8.06; 
p = 0.002; padj = 0.018) was found for negative valence 
emotions of both high (β = 0.47; t(23) = 2.45; p = 0.03) 
and low arousal (β = 0.52; t(23) = 3.07; p = 0.01). Finally, 
for the OFC cluster, the significant model included the 
category of negative scales with high arousal (R = 0.46; 
F(1,34) = 8.91; p = 0.005; padj = 0.022). Figure 2 shows 
the locations of clusters which revealed significant corre-
spondence with the VAD dimensions. Results of additional 
correlational analysis between clusters’ beta power and dis-
crete PANAS-X scales are shown in Table 4. The regression 
results were verified using the leave-one-out cross-valida-
tion procedure (LOOCV), which revealed relatively high 
accuracies of the models (MCC: 72.6 %, LATL: 84.7 %, 
ACC: 75.9 %, OFC: 77.4 %).
Discussion
The current study explored whether the VAD (valence, 
arousal, and dominance) dimensional model of emotion 
can reflect the neural basis of subjectively experienced 
affect in a clearer and more understandable way than the 
locationist approach based on discrete emotions.
Three of the brain clusters (RATL, RPTL, and PCC) 
were related to only one discrete emotion (however, 
not in a unique way), while another four (MCC, ACC, 
LATL, and OFC) showed correlations with more than one 
Table 1  Mean ratings and standard deviations of PANAS-X scales
Mean SD
Basic negative emotion scales
 Fear 1.53 0.61
 Hostility 1.20 0.40
 Guilt 1.43 0.64
 Sadness 1.90 0.77
Basic positive emotion scales
 Joviality 2.95 0.64
 Self-assurance 3.00 0.58
 Attentiveness 3.80 0.57
Other affective states
 Shyness 1.69 0.60
 Fatigue 2.25 0.84
 Serenity 3.44 0.55
 Surprise 2.11 0.83
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Table 2  Rankings of PANAS-X scales on VAD dimensions and their assignment according to VAD values (low, moderate, high)
Hostility Guilt Fear Sadness Shyness Fatigue Surprise Calmness Attentive Self-assurance Joviality
Valence
 Mean −3.73 −3.48 −3.28 −3.26 −2.65 −2.04 0.58 2.53 3.02 3.19 4.17
 SD 0.78 1.05 0.88 1.15 0.98 1.35 0.93 1.07 1.10 0.97 0.58
 Assignment NEG NEG NEG NEG NEG NEG POS POS POS POS POS
Arousal
 Mean 3.08 1.69 2.36 0.04 0.44 −1.00 2.62 −0.91 2.18 3.50 3.93
 SD 1.12 1.76 1.15 2.16 1.76 2.18 1.28 2.06 1.56 1.03 0.77
 Assignment HI MD HI LO LO LO HI LO HI HI HI
Dominance
 Mean 1.81 −1.24 −0.93 −2.52 −3.10 −3.34 0.12 −1.73 2.03 3.38 2.80
 SD 1.64 1.68 1.64 1.56 1.56 1.41 1.40 1.72 1.52 1.06 1.16
 Assignment HI LO LO LO LO LO MD LO HI HI HI
Table 3  The locations of 
revealed clusters
Cluster no. Location Cluster centroid Talairach coordinates
x y z
1 Middle cingulate cortex (MCC) −19 −11 34
2 Right anterior temporal lobe (RATL) 39 3 −23
3 Anterior cinglulate cortex (ACC) 4 10 8
4 Right temporoparietal junction (RTPJ) 31 −51 21
5 Posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) −7 −33 28
6 Right posterior temporal lobe (RPTL) 30 −67 13
7 Right parietal lobe 43 −37 29
8 Left anterior temporal lobe (LATL) −36 8 −18
9 Orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) 7 30 −22
Fig. 2  Location of clusters significantly associated with VAD dimensions with the constituting independent components
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emotion. When analysing relationships between discrete 
PANAS-X emotions and the activity of brain clusters, six 
of the scales (hostility, fear, sadness, shyness, fatigue, 
and joviality) were associated with more than one clus-
ter, while another three (guilt, calmness, and self-assur-
ance) were linked to a single one. No significant effects 
were found for surprise and attentiveness. Although these 
screening results should be treated with caution, it was 
shown that the relationships between discrete emotions 
and brain clusters are far from being clear. In this respect, 
the results resemble numerous studies (mostly from the 
fMRI domain), where co-variation effects between emo-
tions and focal brain activations were found; however, 
many of them were difficult to replicate (Kober et al. 
2008; Lindquist et al. 2012). These observations are con-
trary to the basic postulate of the locationist approach 
with regard to the uniqueness and specificity of brain acti-
vations for different emotions.
Analysis of the self-reports expressed in terms of the 
VAD dimensions revealed that the activity in four out of 
nine brain clusters was related to the current emotional 
state. The cluster located in the ACC was associated with 
emotions of negative valence and low arousal. Indeed, 
hyperactivation of this structure is often reported in indi-
viduals suffering from depressed mood or chronic pain 
(Nemoto et al. 2007; Yoshimura et al. 2010; Vytal and 
Hamann 2010; Etkin et al. 2011). The ACC is also thought 
to be a part of the network associated directly with the sub-
jective experience of sadness (Damasio et al. 2000; Phan 
et al. 2002; Habel et al. 2005) and the affective aspect of 
pain (Singer et al. 2004; Medford and Critchley 2010). Our 
results fully support these data and, moreover, emphasize 
the common experiential quality related to the activation of 
the ACC: negative valence and low arousal.
Contrarily, the OFC cluster turned out to be associated 
with negative and highly arousing emotions. This is in line 
with some studies where activation of this structure was 
associated with emotions of fear, disgust, or anger (Phan 
et al. 2002; Murphy et al. 2003; Lindquist et al. 2012) but 
in contrast to others, where the OFC was also related to 
positive emotions (Kirkland and Cunningham 2011; Wyc-
zesany et al. 2014). The orbitofrontal areas are well known 
to be crucial for many emotional functions, including 
appraisal and assigning a motivational value to stimuli for 
both positive and negative emotions. These areas are also 
possibly linked with the experience of affective value of 
both concrete and abstract stimuli (O’Doherty et al. 2003; 
Rolls and Grabenhorst 2008; Carvajal et al. 2013). It has 
also been shown that distinct OFC regions can be associ-
ated with either positive or negative emotions (Kringel-
bach 2005). However, it is not clear to what extent these 
observations are associated with affective experience per 
se and are not confounded by emotional perception or 
motivational learning. The fact that positive emotions are 
linked mostly to the medial OFC, which is more difficult to 
reach by surface recording, can explain the lack of positive 
valence effects in our data. The spatial resolution of EEG, 
however, does not allow for such precise inferences about 
source localization, and more data are needed to clarify this 
issue.
Interestingly, within negative emotions, there was a dou-
ble dissociation observed, where the ACC was related only 
to low arousing, while the OFC only to highly arousing 
emotions (this is also visible in the results of correlations 
with discrete PANAS-X scales). This suggests that these 
two categories of emotions involve at least partly separate 
circuits.
The cluster located in the MCC was, interestingly, 
related to low dominance emotions of negative valence. In 
the literature, the activity of this area is usually attributed to 
pain, disgust, fear, or sadness (Vogt 2005; Colibazzi et al. 
2010; Stevens et al. 2011; Lindquist et al. 2012), which are 
indeed unpleasant emotions characterized by a low sense of 
control. On the other hand, an analysis by Anderson et al. 
(2013) based on 2603 neuroimaging experiments in differ-
ent task domains, showed that the MCC region (labelled 
there as dACC) is strongly associated with the emotion of 
disgust, moderately with fear, happiness and sadness, and 
not related to anger. Although these findings partly support 
our observations, they also mention some positive states. 
Table 4  Significant correlations between PANAS-X scales and beta power in selected IC clusters
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01
Hostility Guilt Fear Sadness Shyness Fatigue Surprise Calmness Attentive Self-assurance Joviality
MCC 0.39* 0.34* 0.36* −0.38*
RATL 0.43**
ACC 0.37* 0.31* 0.33*
RPTL 0.33*
PCC 0.54**
LATL 0.31* 0.45** 0.43* 0.44** 0.43** −0.36*
OFC 0.35* 0.27*
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When taking a deeper look at the intermediate steps of the 
regression analysis, the low dominance negative and posi-
tive emotions were also found to significantly predict the 
MCC activity. However, finally, the model with a single 
predictor (i.e. negative valence and low dominance) was 
chosen as the optimal one, bearing most predictive power. 
Hence, although this result ultimately points exclusively to 
negative, low dominance emotions, some contribution of 
positive states of low dominance cannot be ruled out. This 
issue certainly requires more data in order to be entirely 
clarified, but the role of dominance as an important dis-
crimination factor explaining the activity of the MCC is 
supported.
Lastly, the LATL cluster was linked in our data with all 
types of negative emotions. The literature data link this 
region with experiencing sadness, anxiety, fear, and anger 
(Gloor et al. 1982; George et al. 1995). A review by Wong 
and Gallate (2012) mentions that this area is activated dur-
ing a wide range of tasks including: watching sad, angry 
or disgusting movies, and recalling events related to emo-
tions of anger, fear, sadness, or anxiety (effects were spe-
cific for the left or bilateral hemisphere). Another review 
by Lindquist et al. (2012) showed that experience of anger 
is most likely to activate the LATL (compared with other 
basic emotions). Generally, many negative emotions, irre-
spective of arousal or dominance, are confirmed to activate 
this area, and these characteristics are possibly related to 
the nearby limbic area (Olson et al. 2007). It is also clearly 
seen that the LATL is not specific to any single discrete 
emotion. However, it should be noted that a few reviewed 
experiments showed some activations in the LATL during 
positive emotions as well. Hence, it is still possible that 
negative valence cannot fully explain the activation of this 
region, and that this region is involved in mediating emo-
tional processes of both negative and positive valence. It 
can also be explained by association with the left amyg-
dala, which is recruited during processing of emotionally 
arousing content, irrespective of valence (Hamann and Mao 
2002).
An alternative perspective for understanding the role of 
the LATL is brought by recent data from Lindquist et al. 
(2014) who argues that this area associated with seman-
tic memory is crucial for integrating affective perception 
with conceptual knowledge on discrete emotions and their 
meaning. This interpretation comes from the observation of 
patients with LATL lesions and their impaired perception 
of discrete emotions but not basic affective states (valence 
dimension). On the basis of the constructionist approach, 
which assumes the common neural ground of different 
aspects of emotional processes, we could suggest that the 
proposed role of the LATL area also applies to emotional 
experience. Moreover, the fact that perception of basic 
affective dimensions (valence) was preserved may suggest 
that the description of emotional experience on the VAD 
dimensions is more basic and associated with core affect, 
while discrete emotions are more dependent on socializa-
tion and conceptualization processes.
The question arises as to why most of our observations 
relate to negative emotions, while the literature data regard-
ing positive affect (especially in the case of the LATL and 
OFC clusters) were not confirmed. However, it is often 
observed that effects of positive emotions, especially in 
laboratory conditions, tend to be weaker than those visible 
in negative states, which was the case in our study (George 
et al. 1995). We can speculate that our experimental design, 
with no explicit emotion induction, did not differentiate 
subjects sufficiently to provide enough power for statistical 
tests in the case of the positive items. It is also possible that 
positive states—which are phenomenologically less spe-
cific2—are more difficult to investigate. Some data suggest 
that positive emotions can be associated with opposite acti-
vations within nearby brain areas (Damasio et al. 2000), 
which could cancel each other out in an EEG recording 
characterized by low spatial resolution. Certainly, this 
apparent dominance of negative emotions in predicting 
brain activity patterns requires furthers studies. Moreover, 
other measurement conditions, including active task and 
mood manipulations, need to be considered in future 
research in order to identify the potential bias of passive 
rest conditions (Wyczesany et al. 2011).
Taken together, experience of negatively valenced emo-
tions was associated with activations of all considered clus-
ters; however, they differed regarding either the arousal 
(ACC, OFC, and LATL) or the dominance (MCC) dimen-
sion. This shows that self-description of emotional experi-
ence using VAD dimensions can reflect real brain activity, 
which adds support to recent fMRI data (Nielen et al. 2009; 
Baucom et al. 2012). The analysis based on higher level, 
i.e. more general, dimensions turned out to introduce more 
clear and ordered relationships between self-report and 
brain activity than observed in the case of discrete emo-
tions. This result favours the constructionist view, which 
assumes that our emotions are not based on separate and 
specific brain “processors”, but are rather constructed from 
more general dimensions by distributed neural networks of 
interconnected structures. Their activity in different config-
urations could “produce” emotions, which are then labelled 
as discrete entities. Thus, emotions which are located close 
to each other in the VAD space are supposed to show rel-
atively similar patterns of brain activations. This is also 
2
 The list of five basic emotions includes happiness, sadness, fear, 
anger, and disgust, where only the first one is positive. This nega-
tive bias is also visible in the number of emotion labels in many lan-
guages (Rozin et al. 2010).
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supported in our data, where similar emotions gathered 
together in VAD categories could be associated with acti-
vations of specific clusters. Concluding, our results show 
that self-report expressed in terms of VAD dimensions 
can explain a significant part of the variability observed in 
selected brain areas.
Finally, some limitations and future directions should be 
mentioned. As our conclusions were drawn on the basis of 
a passive, no-task procedure, it would be recommended to 
extend similar analysis to other experimental conditions. 
Indeed, the majority of studies on emotions used some 
kind of affect induction, among which standardized visual 
pictures are most common (Lang et al. 1999; Keil et al. 
2002). As the processes of emotional perception and emo-
tional experience are tightly bound, comparison of results 
in conditions of evoked affect remains an important issue. 
One should also be aware that gender differences may 
play a role in emotional processes (Sabatinelli et al. 2004). 
We also note that the stepwise regression applied here is 
not hypothesis driven and thus increases the risk of type I 
errors. The exploratory nature of this study can justify this 
approach and additional precautions (multiple comparison 
correction, cross-validation) to minimize possible chance 
findings. Validation of revealed ROIs with the NIRS tech-
nique would also be beneficial to allow for both precise 
localization and (unlike the fMRI) relatively natural meas-
urement conditions.
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